Decided: March 14, 2007
Judge Scott Fairgrieve, NASSAU COUNTY, District Court
For Petitioner: Ezratty, Ezratty & Levine, LLP
For Defendant: Michael Wigutow, Esq. of Counsel to Jeffrey A. Siegel, Esq.
Petitioner Village of Rockville Centre Housing Authority commenced this holdover proceeding against respondents Sharon L. Shamosh and Janice Romano. Petitioner, a governmental housing agency, served a notice of termination on respondents citing "substantial and serious violations of the lease including prohibitions on possessing illegal weapons . . . and criminal or improper activity . . . which threaten the health and safety of other community residents." The issue before the Court is whether the notice of termination of the lease referring to nothing more than "substantial and serious violations" sufficiently and specifically informed the tenants of the grounds for termination.
Termination notices served upon governmental housing tenants must refer to the statutory grounds for termination, Facts establishing the existence of such ground, and date upon which the tenant is required to surrender possession of the premises to the landlord. Chinatown Apartments, Inc. v. Chu Cho Lan, 51 NY2d 786, 412 NE2d 1312 (1980) (landlord's notice of intention to terminate occupancy citing the unauthorized erection of a "partition" was fatally deficient where it did not cite any specific prohibition in the lease which had been violated); City of N.Y. v. Valera, 216 AD2d 237, 628 NYS2d 695 (1995) (termination notice served on month-to-month tenants of governmental housing alleging that "premises were being used for illegal drug transactions and loitering, which constituted a threat to the safety and well-being of other occupants of the buildings" was sufficient and further information could be acquired through a bill of particulars); Landlord and Tenant Practice in New York 13:20.
See also, Black Veterans For Social Justice v. Killeen, NYLJ, March 14, 2007, p18 col 1, holding that the termination notice was insufficient and required dismissal of the summary proceeding.
In the instant case, petitioner merely offers "substantial and serious violations," which failed to cite violation of a specific prohibition in the lease or provide any Facts leading to the grounds for termination. As petitioner's notice does not meet threshold requirements for sufficiency and specificity, the notice of termination of tenancy is insufficient. Therefore, respondent's motion to dismiss is granted.
So Ordered
District CourtJudgeFairgrieve
Friday, March 30, 2007
Wednesday, March 28, 2007
Brady v. Posse, Index No. SCR 1550/06
Decided: February 16, 2007
Judge Philip S. Straniere - Richmond County, Civil Court
Claimant appeared pro se
Counsel for Defendant: Robert Rampulla, Esq., Sak & Rampulla LLP
Claimant, Lori Brady, commenced this small claims action against the defendant, Lourdes Posse, alleging that the defendant concealed a water condition in the basement of the premises 265 Elverton Avenue, Staten Island, New York when defendant sold the premises to claimant in October 2006. A trial was held on November 30, 2006. Claimant represented herself. Defendant was represented by counsel.
Claimant testified that after moving into the above premises in October 2006, she removed wallpaper in the basement and found a serious mold condition in an area behind a basement refrigerator that existed because of a crack in the foundation. Claimant had a structural inspection done prior to purchase of the premises but neither the foundation crack nor the mold condition was revealed. The inspector testified that the mold was behind a refrigerator that he had not moved as part of the inspection process…Claimant paid to have the mold condition corrected and the leak sealed and is seeking to be reimbursed for those expenses by the defendant.
LEGAL ISSUES PRESENTED:
A. Is Real Property Law Article 12-B Applicable?
1. Can an unlicensed home inspector testify?
RPL 444-d provides: "No person shall conduct or represent that he or she has the ability to conduct a home inspection for compensation unless such person is: 1. licensed as home inspector pursuant to this article; . . . the purpose of the licensing statute is to protect the public, the Court cannot entertain the witness' testimony no matter how sincere and accurate it may have been. To do so would negate the intent of RPL Article 12-B and would permit a continuous stream of unlicensed "home inspectors" to render opinions, a practice which the legislature has sought to eliminate…
2. Does the statute create a cause of action against an unlicensed home inspector?
…Since this is not a suit by the purchaser against the unlicensed home inspector, the Court will not reach a conclusion as to this issue in this litigation.
B. Is the PCDA Applicable to this transaction?
…Had the PCDA been mandatory, then the defendant herein would have had to have completed the disclosure form, thereby potentially establishing a basis for an action in common law fraud. This Court has pointed out that the PCDA does not create its own statutory cause of action…The PCDA is not applicable to this transaction and once again provides no protection to the consumer.
D. Did the Claimant Establish Common Law Fraud?
…If the leak was a latent defect then the claimant has to prove the defendant knew of the condition and deliberately failed to reveal it. The claimant did not establish this. If the leak was a patent defect then it was open, obvious and readily able to be discovered upon reasonable observation. In such a situation, the defendant would not have to say anything because the claimant should have discovered the condition.
CONCLUSION:
Judgment for defendant. Claimant has failed to prove her prima facie case. Claimant's cause of action is dismissed on the merits.
The foregoing constitutes the decision and order of the Court.
Judge Philip S. Straniere - Richmond County, Civil Court
Claimant appeared pro se
Counsel for Defendant: Robert Rampulla, Esq., Sak & Rampulla LLP
Claimant, Lori Brady, commenced this small claims action against the defendant, Lourdes Posse, alleging that the defendant concealed a water condition in the basement of the premises 265 Elverton Avenue, Staten Island, New York when defendant sold the premises to claimant in October 2006. A trial was held on November 30, 2006. Claimant represented herself. Defendant was represented by counsel.
Claimant testified that after moving into the above premises in October 2006, she removed wallpaper in the basement and found a serious mold condition in an area behind a basement refrigerator that existed because of a crack in the foundation. Claimant had a structural inspection done prior to purchase of the premises but neither the foundation crack nor the mold condition was revealed. The inspector testified that the mold was behind a refrigerator that he had not moved as part of the inspection process…Claimant paid to have the mold condition corrected and the leak sealed and is seeking to be reimbursed for those expenses by the defendant.
LEGAL ISSUES PRESENTED:
A. Is Real Property Law Article 12-B Applicable?
1. Can an unlicensed home inspector testify?
RPL 444-d provides: "No person shall conduct or represent that he or she has the ability to conduct a home inspection for compensation unless such person is: 1. licensed as home inspector pursuant to this article; . . . the purpose of the licensing statute is to protect the public, the Court cannot entertain the witness' testimony no matter how sincere and accurate it may have been. To do so would negate the intent of RPL Article 12-B and would permit a continuous stream of unlicensed "home inspectors" to render opinions, a practice which the legislature has sought to eliminate…
2. Does the statute create a cause of action against an unlicensed home inspector?
…Since this is not a suit by the purchaser against the unlicensed home inspector, the Court will not reach a conclusion as to this issue in this litigation.
B. Is the PCDA Applicable to this transaction?
…Had the PCDA been mandatory, then the defendant herein would have had to have completed the disclosure form, thereby potentially establishing a basis for an action in common law fraud. This Court has pointed out that the PCDA does not create its own statutory cause of action…The PCDA is not applicable to this transaction and once again provides no protection to the consumer.
D. Did the Claimant Establish Common Law Fraud?
…If the leak was a latent defect then the claimant has to prove the defendant knew of the condition and deliberately failed to reveal it. The claimant did not establish this. If the leak was a patent defect then it was open, obvious and readily able to be discovered upon reasonable observation. In such a situation, the defendant would not have to say anything because the claimant should have discovered the condition.
CONCLUSION:
Judgment for defendant. Claimant has failed to prove her prima facie case. Claimant's cause of action is dismissed on the merits.
The foregoing constitutes the decision and order of the Court.
Friday, March 23, 2007
Judge rules for Sheffield's tenants
Kent Swig
A housing court judge this week dealt a blow to developer Kent Swig's plan to evict 23 market-rate tenants from the Sheffield 57 condo conversion at 322 West 57th Street. If the ruling is upheld, developers will not be able to evict market-rate tenants while a conversion is in progress, even if their leases are up and have not been renewed. Swig will appeal. "The law is black and white. If you don't have a lease and you are not rent-regulated, then you have no right to occupy," he said. more [NYO]
And more [Post]
Tuesday, March 20, 2007
672 Ninth Avenue LLC v. Burbach, 90358/06
Decided: February 9, 2007
Judge Gary F. Marton, Civil Court, NEW YORK COUNTY
Petitioner's counsel: Sperber Denenberg & Kahan, P.C.
Respondent's counsel: James Briscoe West, PLLC.
Respondent Undertenant Pro Se: Bruce Silleg
Read full decision here
In this holdover proceeding, petitioner alleges that respondent Burbach violated the lease for the premises by subletting it without obtaining petitioner's consent and by charging a rent significantly in excess of the legal maximum. Respondent defends on the grounds that the violation has been cured and that the violation was not so egregious as to justify termination of the tenancy. Now, the parties move and cross-move for summary judgment and attorney's fees. As set out below, petitioner's motion is granted and respondent's motion is denied.
THE FACTS
By a written agreement dated June 10, 2005 Burbach sublet the premises to respondent Silleg at a rent of $1,200.00 per month…Burbach did not seek either pursuant to Real Property Law §226-b or otherwise petitioner's consent to sublet.
Specifically, Rent Stabilization Code §2525.6(b) prohibits a tenant from charging a subtenant more than the legal rent, plus a 10 percent surcharge if the apartment is fully furnished. Where the tenant is in violation of this prohibition, Rent Stabilization Code §2525.6(f) entitles the owner to terminate the tenancy." BLF Realty Corp. v. Kasher, 299 AD2d 87, 90-91 (1st Dep't, 2002), lv dismissed, 100 NY2d 535 (2003).
Thus, for roughly a year Burbach charged Silleg 24 percent more than the maximum legal rent.
Respondent contends that she cured the violation by promptly refunding the excess payment and terminating Silleg's subtenancy. She argues as well that even if the foregoing did not constitute a cure, the violation was not so egregious as to warrant termination of her tenancy.
Petitioner argues that the violation was not curable and, alternatively, that even if it was cured the tenancy should be terminated..
RESULT
Respondent sublet the premises without first obtaining petitioner's consent. Respondent also sublet the premises at an illegal rent. Each of these, the court holds, was a substantial violation of the lease. Accordingly, the court grants petitioner a judgment of possession; a warrant may issue forthwith.
However, the 24 percent overcharge here does not constitute "profiteering" or "commercial exploitation" as those terms were used in Yonke, Pendry, Ariel, and Shook. Further, respondent secured the subtenant's departure and refunded so much of the rent as was paid in excess of the legal maximum. Accordingly, should petitioner secure the issuance of a warrant, the court holds that its execution shall be permanently stayed.
Judge Gary F. Marton, Civil Court, NEW YORK COUNTY
Petitioner's counsel: Sperber Denenberg & Kahan, P.C.
Respondent's counsel: James Briscoe West, PLLC.
Respondent Undertenant Pro Se: Bruce Silleg
Read full decision here
In this holdover proceeding, petitioner alleges that respondent Burbach violated the lease for the premises by subletting it without obtaining petitioner's consent and by charging a rent significantly in excess of the legal maximum. Respondent defends on the grounds that the violation has been cured and that the violation was not so egregious as to justify termination of the tenancy. Now, the parties move and cross-move for summary judgment and attorney's fees. As set out below, petitioner's motion is granted and respondent's motion is denied.
THE FACTS
By a written agreement dated June 10, 2005 Burbach sublet the premises to respondent Silleg at a rent of $1,200.00 per month…Burbach did not seek either pursuant to Real Property Law §226-b or otherwise petitioner's consent to sublet.
Specifically, Rent Stabilization Code §2525.6(b) prohibits a tenant from charging a subtenant more than the legal rent, plus a 10 percent surcharge if the apartment is fully furnished. Where the tenant is in violation of this prohibition, Rent Stabilization Code §2525.6(f) entitles the owner to terminate the tenancy." BLF Realty Corp. v. Kasher, 299 AD2d 87, 90-91 (1st Dep't, 2002), lv dismissed, 100 NY2d 535 (2003).
Thus, for roughly a year Burbach charged Silleg 24 percent more than the maximum legal rent.
Respondent contends that she cured the violation by promptly refunding the excess payment and terminating Silleg's subtenancy. She argues as well that even if the foregoing did not constitute a cure, the violation was not so egregious as to warrant termination of her tenancy.
Petitioner argues that the violation was not curable and, alternatively, that even if it was cured the tenancy should be terminated..
RESULT
Respondent sublet the premises without first obtaining petitioner's consent. Respondent also sublet the premises at an illegal rent. Each of these, the court holds, was a substantial violation of the lease. Accordingly, the court grants petitioner a judgment of possession; a warrant may issue forthwith.
However, the 24 percent overcharge here does not constitute "profiteering" or "commercial exploitation" as those terms were used in Yonke, Pendry, Ariel, and Shook. Further, respondent secured the subtenant's departure and refunded so much of the rent as was paid in excess of the legal maximum. Accordingly, should petitioner secure the issuance of a warrant, the court holds that its execution shall be permanently stayed.
Wednesday, March 14, 2007
MHM Sponsors Co. v. Hirsch - Index No. 79366/06
Decided: February 22, 2007
Civil Court - NEW YORK COUNTY
Judge David B. Cohen
Belkin Burden Wenig & Goldman, LLP
Attorneys for Petitioner, by: Robert T. Holland
Ms. Paulette Hirsch
Respondent Pro Se
Click here to read the full decision
INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND
In this holdover proceeding, petitioner seeks to recover possession of the premises claiming that respondent has unreasonably withheld access to her apartment to perform necessary repairs, specifically the replacement of the wood floorings throughout the apartment.
QUESTION PRESENTED
If a landlord is entitled to a judgment of possession against a tenant who refuses access for the landlord to cure a housing code violation requiring the repair or replacement of the wood floor in her apartment because she claims that her health will be adversely affected by the glue used to lay the new floor?
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
The RSC authorizes eviction proceedings against a tenant where "the tenant has unreasonably refused the owner access to the housing accommodation for the purpose of making necessary repairs or improvements required by law or authorized by the DHCR . . . " (RSC §2524.4 [e]; Anderson v. Bidlo, 2002 N.Y. Slip Op. 50113[U] [App Term 1st Dept 2002]). It is undisputed that there is a report of violation imposing upon petitioner a legal requirement to repair the missing wood floor tiles throughout the entire apartment. Respondent claims that her refusal of access was not unreasonable since she could be harmed by the glue petitioner would have used to put down the new wood floor. This court's research has turned up no legal precedent setting forth the circumstances under which a tenant's refusal to provide access has been held unreasonable.
The use of the word "unreasonable" in RSC §2524.4 (e) requires the application of an objective standard… "The [reasonable person] standard provides sufficient flexibility, and leeway, to permit due allowance to be made . . . for all of the particular circumstances of the case which may reasonably affect the conduct required" (Restatement [Second] of Torts §283, comment c; see also, Prosser and Keeton, op. cit., at 174)…Bethel, 92 NY2d at 353. Thus, in applying an objective standard the court must consider what "an ordinarily prudent and cautious [person] under the circumstances" would have thought and acted. People v. Cantor, 36 NY2d at 113.
Further, a person of ordinary prudence, who was susceptible to an allergic reaction during a repair, would mitigate the short term risk to health by absenting herself from the premises during the period of glueing and drying. Thus, the continuing hazzard caused by the broken floor would be abated and the short term potential hazzard from the glue avoided.
Instead, respondent refused access to perform the repair to the floor. Such refusal of access was unreasonable under the circumstances as it allowed the risk posed by the dangerous floor to continue when a reasonable course of conduct would have permitted the repair while protecting respondent from a possible health risk.
Accordingly, petitioner is granted a judgment of possession as against respondent. Issuance of the warrant shall be stayed for ten (10) days after service of a copy of this order with notice of entry upon respondent for respondent to cure (see RPAPL §753 [4]). Cure may be effectuated by respondent providing petitioner two consecutive business dates of access during the ten day cure period. Petitioner is to be provided unrestricted access to all areas of the apartment where the parquet wood floor is to be replaced. All items of personal property are to be removed by respondent from such areas in order that petitioner may have unrestricted access to perform the repair.
This constitutes the decision, order and judgment of the court.
Civil Court - NEW YORK COUNTY
Judge David B. Cohen
Belkin Burden Wenig & Goldman, LLP
Attorneys for Petitioner, by: Robert T. Holland
Ms. Paulette Hirsch
Respondent Pro Se
Click here to read the full decision
INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND
In this holdover proceeding, petitioner seeks to recover possession of the premises claiming that respondent has unreasonably withheld access to her apartment to perform necessary repairs, specifically the replacement of the wood floorings throughout the apartment.
QUESTION PRESENTED
If a landlord is entitled to a judgment of possession against a tenant who refuses access for the landlord to cure a housing code violation requiring the repair or replacement of the wood floor in her apartment because she claims that her health will be adversely affected by the glue used to lay the new floor?
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
The RSC authorizes eviction proceedings against a tenant where "the tenant has unreasonably refused the owner access to the housing accommodation for the purpose of making necessary repairs or improvements required by law or authorized by the DHCR . . . " (RSC §2524.4 [e]; Anderson v. Bidlo, 2002 N.Y. Slip Op. 50113[U] [App Term 1st Dept 2002]). It is undisputed that there is a report of violation imposing upon petitioner a legal requirement to repair the missing wood floor tiles throughout the entire apartment. Respondent claims that her refusal of access was not unreasonable since she could be harmed by the glue petitioner would have used to put down the new wood floor. This court's research has turned up no legal precedent setting forth the circumstances under which a tenant's refusal to provide access has been held unreasonable.
The use of the word "unreasonable" in RSC §2524.4 (e) requires the application of an objective standard… "The [reasonable person] standard provides sufficient flexibility, and leeway, to permit due allowance to be made . . . for all of the particular circumstances of the case which may reasonably affect the conduct required" (Restatement [Second] of Torts §283, comment c; see also, Prosser and Keeton, op. cit., at 174)…Bethel, 92 NY2d at 353. Thus, in applying an objective standard the court must consider what "an ordinarily prudent and cautious [person] under the circumstances" would have thought and acted. People v. Cantor, 36 NY2d at 113.
Further, a person of ordinary prudence, who was susceptible to an allergic reaction during a repair, would mitigate the short term risk to health by absenting herself from the premises during the period of glueing and drying. Thus, the continuing hazzard caused by the broken floor would be abated and the short term potential hazzard from the glue avoided.
Instead, respondent refused access to perform the repair to the floor. Such refusal of access was unreasonable under the circumstances as it allowed the risk posed by the dangerous floor to continue when a reasonable course of conduct would have permitted the repair while protecting respondent from a possible health risk.
Accordingly, petitioner is granted a judgment of possession as against respondent. Issuance of the warrant shall be stayed for ten (10) days after service of a copy of this order with notice of entry upon respondent for respondent to cure (see RPAPL §753 [4]). Cure may be effectuated by respondent providing petitioner two consecutive business dates of access during the ten day cure period. Petitioner is to be provided unrestricted access to all areas of the apartment where the parquet wood floor is to be replaced. All items of personal property are to be removed by respondent from such areas in order that petitioner may have unrestricted access to perform the repair.
This constitutes the decision, order and judgment of the court.
Tuesday, March 13, 2007
Real Estate Development:
A tipster alerts us to some changes within the Dept. of Buildings meant to limit over-zealous builders. He writes, "as of last week the DOB pre-filers will be keeping a set of signed and sealed plans at time of filing (4 sets will now be needed). The plans will be given to an inspector who will then go to the site and make sure work has not been done yet. If it has been done already or is in process, the site will receive a stop work order along with violations for working without a permit."
Via Curbed.com
Via Curbed.com
Thursday, March 8, 2007
This woman was bugged
BY JOSE MARTINEZ
DAILY NEWS STAFF WRITER
A Windsor Terrace woman is suing her landlord after bedbugs allegedly drove her out of the apartment where she lived for nearly 25 years.
"It was my castle," Ellyn Gliksman-Sullivan said of her rent-stabilized unit on Prospect Park Southwest.
But according to a lawsuit filed yesterday in Brooklyn State Supreme Court, Gliksman-Sullivan had to bail out when her landlord failed to address her repeated complaints about biting bedbugs.
The nasty critters surfaced last June, she said, leaving bites the size of quarters all over her body. They allegedly kept feasting on her into December, when a biopsy revealed she had repeatedly been the victim of bedbugs.
Gliksman-Sullivan then moved to upstate Goshen, leaving behind her possessions in Brooklyn.
"It was horrible," she said.
Gliksman-Sullivan said she made repeated complaints to Isaac Wade, the managing agent for her landlord, the Manhattan Eight Corp. The best he could do, she said, was to send over an exterminator for a quick visit.
"The exterminator came and went in about 10 minutes," said her attorney, Alan Schnurman. "The managing agent never came to the phone again after that."
Neither Wade nor representatives at Manhattan Eight's Brooklyn office could be reached for comment.
The lawsuit charges that Gliksman-Sullivan suffered "pain, shock and mental anguish" when her landlord allegedly allowed her carpeting, clothing and bed to become infested.
Gliksman-Sullivan paid $655 a month for the apartment, which she said had not been infested by any critters before last June.
She said said hasn't given up on returning.
"It was my home of 25 years - absolutely, I want to go back," Gliksman-Sullivan said.
Her lawsuit seeks more than $3 million in damages.
"Hopefully, the landlord will rectify the situation," Schnurman said. "It is his obligation."
It's Official: Judge Flips Bird to Finger Building
Williamsburg's Finger Building won't be growing to 16 stories from its current 10. The building has been tied up in court, but a judge has issued a decision denying the developer's motion to grow the Finger another six stories. The case hinged on the question of roof decks that developer Mendel Brach and architect Robert Scarano built over some adjoining buildings that the property owners said they didn't have a right to build. The 'open space' would have allowed a building taller than ten stories. A reading of the decision, which landed in our inbox via a special correspondent, shows the judge siding with the property owners. A few of the judge's words for those of you that like such things:
Based upon the foregoing, the motion for summary judgment seeking a declaration that the Developer purchased “open space” rights to the rooftops of 115 and 138 from Iqbal is denied in its entirety.
In plain English, the Finger stays at ten stories. Unless there's an appeal and a different decision. Meantime, keep putting in those windows.
Original Source: Robert Curbed.com
Wednesday, March 7, 2007
KOKOT V. GREEN L&T 94223/06
Civil Court
New York County
READ THE FULL DECISION HERE
Judge Peter M. Wendt
SUMMARY: Holdover proceeding by Petitioner to recover possession of rent stabilized premises for use and occupancy by Petitioner.(Kokot)
Rent Stabilization Code (RSC) §2524.2(b)requires that a landlord serve a notice of non-renewal on a tenant prior to the commencement of an owner use proceeding which must state both the legal ground for eviction and the facts to support such ground.
The reiteration of statutory language in a non renewal based upon owner occupancy alone cannot sustain an eviction proceeding...However, as long as the notice sets forth a number of allegations...that are fact specific to the particular proceeding, indicating actual reasons why possession is necessary, the proceeding may continue.
Here, the notice was very fact specific...The notice clearly specifies who will reside in the subject premises and why Petitioner has a desire to do so. The notice does not merely track statutory language, it clearly states reasons why petitioner seeks the apartment.
Accordingly, respondent's motion for dismissal on the ground that the notice does not state facts sufficient to support the ground for eviction is denied.
The decision goes on to state that the Courts have read into the statute a "good faith intention" as a requisite element for the refusal to renew. "Good Faith" is defined as an intention and desire to gain possession of premises for one's own use.
New York County
READ THE FULL DECISION HERE
Judge Peter M. Wendt
SUMMARY: Holdover proceeding by Petitioner to recover possession of rent stabilized premises for use and occupancy by Petitioner.(Kokot)
Rent Stabilization Code (RSC) §2524.2(b)requires that a landlord serve a notice of non-renewal on a tenant prior to the commencement of an owner use proceeding which must state both the legal ground for eviction and the facts to support such ground.
The reiteration of statutory language in a non renewal based upon owner occupancy alone cannot sustain an eviction proceeding...However, as long as the notice sets forth a number of allegations...that are fact specific to the particular proceeding, indicating actual reasons why possession is necessary, the proceeding may continue.
Here, the notice was very fact specific...The notice clearly specifies who will reside in the subject premises and why Petitioner has a desire to do so. The notice does not merely track statutory language, it clearly states reasons why petitioner seeks the apartment.
Accordingly, respondent's motion for dismissal on the ground that the notice does not state facts sufficient to support the ground for eviction is denied.
The decision goes on to state that the Courts have read into the statute a "good faith intention" as a requisite element for the refusal to renew. "Good Faith" is defined as an intention and desire to gain possession of premises for one's own use.
Tuesday, March 6, 2007
SPECIAL THANKS
I would personally like to thank the following blogs for their warm welcome to the NY BLAWG world. I truly appreciate their support and friendship.
NY Civil Law - Matthew Lerner
Sui Generis - Nicole L. Black
No-Fault Paradise - David M. Gottlieb
NY Civil Law - Matthew Lerner
Sui Generis - Nicole L. Black
No-Fault Paradise - David M. Gottlieb
Monday, March 5, 2007
A&V 425 LLC Contracting Co. v. RFD 55th Street, LLC Index no. 602710/06
Decided 1/23/2007
Supreme Court, County of New York
SUMMARY - For full decision click here
"If certain requirements are fulfilled the Lien Law protects purchasers of real property against mechanic's liens filed by contractors for work performed prior to the purchase of such property. As long as the deed transferring the property complies with the specific requirements of Lien Law §13(5) - i.e., contains the trust fund provision, a lien filed after the recording of the deed is not subject t o foreclosure by the contractor. Here, as set forth below, A&V filed 15 liens, after the individual units were sold by RFD to third parties, for work allegedly performed prior to these sales, and all of the deeds contain the provision required by Lien Law §13(5). As a result, the liens are invalid, and must be discharged pursuant to Lien Law §19(6)"
Supreme Court, County of New York
SUMMARY - For full decision click here
"If certain requirements are fulfilled the Lien Law protects purchasers of real property against mechanic's liens filed by contractors for work performed prior to the purchase of such property. As long as the deed transferring the property complies with the specific requirements of Lien Law §13(5) - i.e., contains the trust fund provision, a lien filed after the recording of the deed is not subject t o foreclosure by the contractor. Here, as set forth below, A&V filed 15 liens, after the individual units were sold by RFD to third parties, for work allegedly performed prior to these sales, and all of the deeds contain the provision required by Lien Law §13(5). As a result, the liens are invalid, and must be discharged pursuant to Lien Law §19(6)"
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)